During the crucial meeting held with the officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs led by its Advisor (North East), A.K. Mishra, at New Delhi on Tuesday concerning the Manipur crisis and to bring normalcy to the state, the Federation of Civil Society Organisations (FOCS) Manipur put forth five key points that highlighted the onset of the conflict till the current situation in Manipur.
Addressing the media in a press conference held in New Delhi at the Press Club of India, Windsor Palace this afternoon, the representation team from the FOCS said the discussion has been very constructive so far with the MHA, and the FOCS during the meeting have also presented a crystal-clear picture with a chronology of events since the onset of conflict with facts and figures and the shifting of direction of conflict currently.
FOCS also highlighted how the senior government officials continue to approach the current crisis in Manipur through the same moral lens that was applied at its onset, May 3, 2023, wherein the officials expressed horror at the “incredible brutality” inflicted on the Kuki-Zo population in the valley areas of the state. And since May 22, 2023, onwards, the nature of the conflict began to shift from mob violence to more organized and militarized executions. The situation has now evolved into a state of significant stalemate. The Kuki-Zo communities have since armed themselves and engaged in violent attacks, often using extreme and diabolical methods. More importantly, it was also the Kuki-Zo elements who first lit the flames of violence in Churachandpur. What unfolded in the valley areas of Manipur in the immediate aftermath of May 3, 2023, was a spontaneous reaction to the planned execution of violence by the Kuki-Zo against the Meiteis in Churachandpur. The question now is whether the government and security forces continue to view Kuki-Zo actions through that original moral framework.
The FOCS also elucidated how the nature of the conflict began to transform from mob violence to more organized and militarized engagements, particularly in the peripheral areas where ethnic boundaries blur. And over time, armed confrontations became more concentrated around strategic chokepoints and “buffer zones.” This second phase was marked by the adoption of standard conventional warfare of marking territory, developing infrastructure, and constructing makeshift bunkers and fortifications. This was the time when the state or the central government should have intervened with resolute force and contained the violence. Allowing the militias to be armed and mobilized along ethnic lines allowed the hardliners to take control of the communities, and moderate voices were subdued.
The FOCS also presented how the conflict started employing ‘Terror Tactics and Grey-Zone’ since June 21, 2023, onwards, with the armed confrontations increasing and confining to 3–4 locations, and how the Kuki militants started adopting terrorist TTPs and grey-zone warfare—a strategy characterized by covert, deniable, and often asymmetric actions. With the key highlight of the incident of detonating IEDs to drone bombing and how the scale of incidents came to a halt with GOI investigation and intervention.
The FOCS also highlighted how valley-based communities, particularly the Meitei, will feel the moral reassurance or sense of closure on separate administration or Union Territory (UT) status demands, which the government officials have consistently stated will never be accepted.
The delegates also presented to the MHA how FOCS feels that the crisis in Manipur, initially viewed through a moral lens that framed the Kuki-Zo communities as victims of “incredible brutality,” has evolved into a complex, militarized conflict requiring urgent strategic reassessment. By late 2023, the dynamics shifted dramatically as Kuki-Zo factions adopted extreme violence—from organized warfare with bunkers and territorial control to drone strikes, missile attacks, and terror tactics like IED blasts on critical infrastructure and sabotage of fuel supplies. Despite sporadic security successes—such as dismantling militant bunkers or NIA arrests—delayed state intervention allowed hardliners to dominate, sidelining moderates and escalating grey-zone tactics. Concurrently, the conflict’s geographical shift toward Indo-Myanmar border zones risks entangling regional security dynamics. Government communication failures further complicate resolution: rejecting Kuki-Zo demands for separate administration as merely “administratively inconvenient” lacks moral weight, whereas affirming Manipur’s historic, indivisible identity could bolster Meitei confidence and deter separatism. The situation demands operational agility, strategic clarity, and a rejection of fatalistic explanations to restore public trust and prevent further erosion of stability.
